

number of persons usually not more than fifty, often less). When a group becomes too numerous so that hunting, gathering and fishing turn unproductive, the group splits. The split is often along the line of relative concepts of “modern” versus “traditional”. Since the reasons for the split grow over time, the critical point is reached when the modernists begin to outnumber the traditionalists. When tensions grow unbearable, in the majority of cases the traditionalists leave, and religious reasons will be quoted for the move. It is more plausible that the world has been settled by traditionalists, than by adventurers (although adventurers may have caused splits, too). Besides, adventurers pushed on without splits. The speed by which mankind expanded has been estimated at five to ten miles per generation on an average (probably the generations were shorter than today). Society is guided by consensus and big man leadership. Consensus is necessary to carry on daily decision-making. Specialists for tracking, kindling fire, making and using tools and weaponry, forecasting the weather, healing, divining and other spiritual services generate leadership in their various proficiencies, and in addition there is frequently an all-round personality as the “big man” in charge. The position big man, if existent, is not inheritable and usually not otherwise transferable. The big man is appointed and dismissed by consent. He is a leader, but not more than the *primus inter pares* within a “close-knit” consensus society. Most big man societies are patrilineal. In matrilineal societies, are there “big women”?

The pattern of the foraging society changes during the neolithic revolution (about 12 000 to 10 000 year ago). People begin to cultivate and thus engage in reproduction for consume, both of plants and animals. Herders, horticulturalists, and farmers reproduce and thus are able to save and store. The ability to reproduce and thus be more independent from hunger is called the *neolithic revolution*.³⁰³ Usable land and access to it by trails become assets. With more durable property, there is wealth (and poverty) and influence (and lack of it). Wealth can be accumulated by processes within the family such as storing, marriage and inheritance.³⁰⁴ Lineage heads become leaders, and when lineages expand, artificial lineages, called clans (often encompassing several lineages), gain importance, and with them clan leaders.³⁰⁵ Since wealth may last beyond a single generation, wealthy families arise, and with them aristocracy – matri-, patri-, ambi-, or bi-lineal. Thus, cultivating societies can generally be characterized by lineage or clan leadership. Leadership may still be vested in big men, especially in early horticulturalist societies (e.g., Kapauku). But for demographic and territorial reasons, lineage and clan leadership will for the most part grow into chieftaincy and inheritable kingdoms.

- b) The next “revolution” in V. G. Childe’s sense, the *urban revolution*, is characterized by a beginning of division of labor: Not everyone does everything anymore for her or his life support. There are now blacksmiths, tanners, potters, and traders. This enables and induces a separation of cities from the surrounding country side. Such centers develop into marketplaces which require a market police. The military, and its financing by taxes, add more power to the leading clan or clans. City kings and territorial kingships become possible. But separation of labor causes specialization and divergent individual and groups interests. Separated labor and abilities tend to reflect themselves in a form of societal leadership that builds upon cooperation. All are needed, and thus all should contribute. The urban revolution calls for a unit to which many should offer their views. Here is where the axial age poses problems: Some post-axial-age cultures tackle the unit-problem, others not.

³⁰³ See Ch. 3 III, above.

³⁰⁴ See Ch. 3 V, above.

³⁰⁵ *ibid.*

- c) The *axial age* is not a “revolution” of this kind, but a just as important step in cultural evolution. It is distinguished from the two revolutions by its independence from time. But what is precisely is the “axial age”?³⁰⁶ *Axial age* means that spirits and gods become confronted with (and possibly get subjected to) a “new” worldwide good-bad ethics. This implies that “axial age” means two different phenomena: a certain period in world history, and a time-independent culture change of any animistic society. Historians roughly fix “the” axial age to the period between 650 and 400 B. C. E. It was the time of many religious founders and foundations: Zoroaster (about 630–560 B. C. E.), the Upanishads, Lao-tse, Confucius, Buddha, the synagogue during the Jewish exile, the Greek polis, etc. From this it follows that the modes of thought that are to be found in this world and explain and categorize the cultures have, next through the “two revolutions”, strongly been shaped by the axial age in the historical sense. It is self-evident that the axial age by its essence (a non-tribal, trans-national and in this sense *secular* good-bad ethics) influences human society and its ideas of leadership. The axial age as described by philosophers and historians concerns the then known world, from Gibraltar to Japan. However, it is possible that another culture, outside of this “old world,” experiences its own axial age *any time* in history or presence. This is meant by “independence from time”.

The influence of the axial age on the societal patterns just described is of special interest here. What do *post-axial age societies*, their leadership, production and distribution, settlement and other complexes typically look like? In the first edition of W. Fikentscher (1995/2004, 170 et seq.) the axial age was introduced in connection with the elements of the modes of thought, whereas V. G. Childe’s two “revolutions” are reported (and utilized for structuring the modes of thought) on p. 238 et seq. in the context of hunters’ and gatherers’ societies. This sequence is not convincing. Childe’s two revolutions should be mentioned first. The axial age should follow since it is particularly important for today’s modes of thought. There may even be talk of three consecutive “revolutions”, the neolithic, the urban, and the axial age. Suggestions were made to add to V. G. Childe’s neolithic and urban revolutions one, two, or three more revolutions, such as rationalism in the 16th century, the industrial age of the late 18th and early 19th century, or the informational revolution during the second half of the 20th century. These suggestions will not be taken up here because their respective reach is significantly more limited than that of the neolithic, the urban, and the axial age ethical revolutions. Indeed, it is the combination of V. Gordon’s two revolutions with Jaspers’ observation of the axial age which is of utmost explanatory force for growth and existence of historical and present-day cultures and thus for a good deal of human history and development. The anthropological consequences for the world in which we live are easy to see: Europe’s “special way”, colonization and decolonization, imperialism, uni-, bi- and multilateralism, the theory of sovereignty in the law of nations, the self-understanding of Han China as land at the center of the world, Africa’s plight, Islam’s disunity – all these shaping factors of the world as we presently find it have been caused by what Childe and Jaspers describe as the hubs of human development, if one combines them.

If there is any development, comparable in its impact on human society to the revolutions Childe has identified, it may very well be globalization, because through its all-pervading turn from knowing an “outside” to the realization that there is only an “inside” left, globalization affects all aspects of human life. In a way, the historical

³⁰⁶ See the discussion with S. N. Eisenstadt EWE 1/2006, 3–16 and 31–34; and, as mentioned, in Chapter 3 III. and Chapter 5 I. 3 above.

axial age was a similar globalization, and a contemporaneous culture change towards “new ethics” contributes to modern globalization because, as mentioned, the core of the axial age cultural revolution is the replacement of behavioral guidance by spirits and gods through a worldwide abstract ethical standard of good and bad.

We now know that this gives the axial age the meaning that humans begin to mentally reflect and doubt guiding rules for their behavior independently from the supernatural, so that pre-axial age “religious types” are defining the belief systems of single tribes or nations, while post-axial age “total religions” address the globe. Therefore, the plurality of cultures as it exists today may be seen as a consequence of the axial age. Pre-axial-age cultures encompass foragers, reproductionists, and those post-urban-revolution cultures that escape or avoid the changes called for by the entry in the axial age: The tasks posed by the axial age as described in 1. c. above (recognition of a world-wide good-bad ethics, individuation of the person as unfolded in Ezechiel 18, solving the issue of the cooperation of the contributors of separated labor, etc.) are either not recognized, or seen but not taken up, or seen and taken up but suppressed by traditional leadership. The urban revolution does not necessarily lead to entry in the axial age, and hence, there are post-urban-revolution pre-axial-age cultures. For societies, the dependency of leadership on belief systems is of considerable impact. Here also lie the reasons for the differences of religions, and for the different societal, economic, and leadership models (Bernard Lewis’ and Samuel Huntington’s “clashes”) in the present world. The axial age the cr total (= world and life explaining) religions and the typical behavioral patterns of their followers. This makes possible to draft a concatenated list of human societies and their appropriate forms of law and economy, societal leadership and power control, taking modes of thought into consideration as they have been shaped by the axial age. But from now on, since post-urban-revolution cultures can be pre- or post-axial-age ones, the distinction between pre- and post-axial-age cultures is more important.³⁰⁷

- d) The preceding paragraphs tried to combine Childe’s “revolutions” and Jaspers’ axial age. The result was the statement that the culture-shaping modes of thought which we find in our present world derive from that combination. This gives rise to the question which modes of thought are presently existing. An overview of the existing modes of thought, and how additional modes of thought can be artificially be composed from their elements (“culture chemistry”) is provided in the book “Modes of Thought”.³⁰⁸ In anthropology, modes of thought shape cultures and “bundle” them to groups of cultures. Condensed versions of these groups follow here:

³⁰⁷ On the “clashes of civilizations” Bernard Lewis, *Die Welt der Ungläubigen*. Frankfurt/Main 1984: Propyläen; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York 1996: Simon & Schuster; Jörg Callies (ed.), *Der Konflikt der Kulturen und der Friede in der Welt, oder: Wie können wir in eine pluralistischen Welt zusammenleben?*, Loccum Protokolle 65/94, Rehberg-Loccum 1995: Evangelische Akademie Loccum. – On the relationship between Childe’ concepts and the modes of thought: In the first edition of the “Modes of Thought” (1995), the axial age was introduced in connection with the elements of the modes of thought on p.170 et seq., while V. G. Childe’s two “revolutions” were reported and used there for structuring the modes of thought on p. 238 et seq., in the context of hunters’ and gatherers’ modes of thought. This sequence seems to me no longer convincing. Childe’s two revolutions should be mentioned first. The axial age should follow those “revolutions” since it is of particular importance for the modes of thought. At any rate, the combination of Childe’s two revolutions with Jaspers’ “discovery” of the axial age is a key to understanding history’s and today’s wealth of cultures, including religions.

³⁰⁸ W. Fikentscher (1995/2004), XVII–XXX 1, and 157–188; similarly, however laying the accent on the dissection of cultures: Nathan Glazer, *Zur Entflechtung von Kultur*, In: Samuel P. Huntington & Lawrence E. Harrison (eds.), *Streit um Werte: Wie Kulturen den Fortschritt pflegen*. Hamburg & Vienna 2002: Europa-Verlag, 293–310, at 298 f. (engl. Orig: *Culture Matters*, 2000; transl. Holger Fliessbach); see also David A. Noebel, *The Battle for Truth*, Eugene, OR 2001: Harvest House Publishers (German ed.:

2. Pre-axial-age cultures. Societal inertia

Pre-axial age societies, composed of either foragers or reproductionists, are characterized by tribal structures and tribal ethics. Tribes are a type of societal entities. The entities may be smaller than a tribe, such as lineages, or clans, phratries, or moieties.³⁰⁹ Or they may be larger, such as nations or federations. But the typical standard for good and bad is what is good and bad as seen from the tribal vantage point. In Hopi, indecent and unseemly behavior is called “ka-hopi”. If the own tribal standard is the decisive criterion for good and bad, outsiders are not “real people”. Therefore, tribal people frequently call themselves simply: “people” or “men” (Navajo: *dinee* = people; Germanic: *dietz*, *deutsch*, *dutch* = people, etc.; Ainu, people on Hokkaido, the northern most of the four great Japanese islands = men, humans; Anywa, a tribe neighboring the Nuer, = men, see Schlee, in Report of the Max-Planck Institute for Social Anthropology 2002/2003, 53 et seq.). Thus, whether outsiders are people of the same sort and quality as the inside group is a problem (Bandelier 1890, 1971).

Pre-axial-age cultures have often been called primitive (Lévy-Bruhl, Murdock, Epstein, etc.). This epithet may be justified with regard to technical tools compared with modern high-tech instruments. It is certainly not justified with respect to mentality and thinking abilities. Practically all field researchers receive, from their contacts with foraging peoples, nomads, horticulturalists and early farmers, cogent impressions of ingenuity and refinement whenever interpersonal relations, expertise in material culture, and survival techniques are concerned. Attempts at analyzing the “primitive mind” have been given up.³¹⁰ Some anthropologists assert that the so-called “primitive mind” in reality often is over-complicated and extremely demanding on the persons involved. When Robert K. Thomas, a Cherokee, married into a Pasqua Yaqui family, it was not easy for him to understand the hints that were necessary to understand the working of a Pasqua Yaqui family (communication Robert D. Cooter, R. K. Thomas’ friend). Compared with the mental life in “close-knit societies”, Western habits often seem easy to follow.

Consensus is necessary to carry on daily decision-making, but finding that consensus is often a matter of high-grade diplomacy. In difficult situations, specialists may become leaders in their various proficiencies. In addition, in foraging and some reproductionist societies, there may be a “big man” as leading figure. Big men are no chiefs. The big man is appointed and dismissed by tribal consent in recognition of his personality and abilities within his “close-knit” consensus society. *Herders, horticulturalists, and farmers* reproduce and thus are able to save and to store harvested goods (provided they are storable). The importance of property increases considerably. The cultural step of being able to reproduce and thus be more independent from hunger is called, as has been mentioned before, the neolithic revolution. The role of the chief grows from the greater demands on internal peace-keeping. More details of the types of leadership in pre-axial-age societies will be discussed in Chapter 9 in the context of maintenance of societal order.

Kampf um Wahrheit: Die bedeutendsten Weltanschauungen im Vergleich, Gräffeling 2007: Resch), who offers a new subject-oriented approach to the modes of thought (chapters on theology, philosophy, ethics, biology, psychology, etc).

³⁰⁹ See Chapter 3 IV 2.

³¹⁰ Mary Douglas (1940). “Bell Curve” research has not changed this. Richard J. Herrnstein & Charles Murray, *The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life*, New York 1994: Free Press, found that intelligence is a better predictor of many life-forming factors including financial income, job performance, unwed pregnancy and crime than parents’ socioeconomic level or education level (an almost banal statement). The authors state no position on a context between IQ and genetics (Introduction to Chapter 13). On the controversy about the book Russel Jacobi & Naomi Glauberman (eds.), *The Bell Curve Debate: History, Documents, Opinions*, New York 1995: Random House.

Pre-axial age societies rely on two elements for the identification of recommendable behavior: on consensus, and on big man or chieftain leadership. Foraging societies prefer big men, for the reasons just mentioned. That big men may also be found in reproducing societies, is due to an effect of (what may be called) *societal inertia*: The appropriate type of leadership for a reproducing, preurban society would be the chief, for the reasons just mentioned. But tradition may leave the institution of the big men unchanged. However, as far as reproducing societies possess storable property, there may be present – in the absence of a chief – extreme egoism and fragmented protection of property. This is an explanation for the “Kapauku capitalism” that has intrigued many economic anthropologists since its description by Pospíšil (1963). The “urban revolution” with its division of labor between professions would call for a type of leadership that profits from the “oversum principle” that the whole is more than the sum of the parts; because ideally the professions have to cooperate. In mathematics, the oversum principle is called super-additivity or superaddition. But not all urban societies decide to make use of superadditive efficiency. Urban societies frequently stay chiefdoms or kingdoms. Their citizens rather remain loyal to their chiefs and kings. Again, there is this “overhang effect” due to societal inertia. Comparable to the continuation of the big-men system in reproducing societies, societal inertia prevails, if not simple fear of power. The architecture of society and its leadership of the former type of the society overhangs into the later type: the big man into reproducing societies, and the chief into the urban societies.³¹¹

Here, at the transition of pre-axial-age tribalism to post-axial-age good-and-bad ethics, the differences between the thought-modal outcomes of the axial age become of decisive importance: There are two fundamentally opposite solutions which the axial age presented to mankind.

One is the recommendation to get detached from this (ugly) world. The other exhorts mankind to stay attached to this world (however ugly it may be). For axial-age world-views which propagate *detachment from the world*, a new interpretation of human society and its respective types of leadership is essentially a non-issue: The world is already doomed and has to be overcome. Therefore, post-axial age modes of thought recommending world denial *will be reluctant to replace* pre-axial age societal patterns by new models and ideals. For axial-age world-views that idealize detachment from the world, a new interpretation of human society becomes possible. The world has to be overcome anyway. It is therefore to be expected that post-axial age modes of thought which recommend world denial *do not replace* pre-axial age societal and leadership patterns, but carry them on as part of the burden to be dropped, understandably playing down their human importance. Hinduism and Buddhism in most of their variants give examples for this attitude: Their thinking about society and leadership does not produce new models, but retain pre-axial-age models combined with disinterested or distanced interpretation. Hinduism pronounces the eternal repetition of forms of life, symbolized by the wheel (*samsara*). Confucianism, a basically sceptical look at human society and leadership as inevitable burdens, adds wise and practical advice how to deal with them. Confucianism is “semi-detached”, but tendencies of a modern tragic mind to fill the gap between semi-detachment and worldly realism have been noted (W. Fikentscher 1995/2004, 160, 307 et seq.). As societal corollary, after the axial age, predominantly world-denying or world-sceptical modes of thought retain chieftaincy, royal or imperial leadership, or one-party top cadres (more details in Chapter 9).

³¹¹ On the importance of these leadership issues for human societal order caused by societal inertia see Chapter 9, below.

By contrast, the basic attitude towards world and life in it is different for *world-attached* axial-age solutions: The consensus tradition is being confronted with a principled doubt whether the result of consensus is good or bad under an ethical standard that no longer flows from clan, tribal or national expediency, but from comparable world-wide standards. Leadership by a big man, chieftain, or king finds itself exposed to critique.³¹²

3. (Post-axial age) East and South Asian cultures

To summarize the genesis and essence of East and South Asian cultures seems to be an overambitious task. It may have been Adolf Bastian who first said that anthropological purposes East and South Asian societies may be grouped together as a significant conglomerate of similar and comparable cultures for. Others followed, some concentrating on one or more single cultures with only cautious glances at East and South Asia as a whole, while others attempted to draw a larger picture and attempting at elaborating on points of comparison.³¹³ Among the latter, Joseph Needham found stability in Chinese and neighboring societies a reason for their relatively high and parallel development, whereas Max Weber saw “worldly ascetism” as a source for culturally related achievements in East and South Asia, most of all in its societies and economies³¹⁴ In the “Modes of Thought” (1995/2004, at 295 et seq.) the typical attitude of East and South Asian cultures is being ascribed to “detachment”, to intended separation from this – in principle – evil world.

Joseph Needham wrote in the fifties and sixties of the 20th century, Max Weber forty years before him. Neither Needham nor Weber could have foreseen the imposition of Marxism on China, Mongolia, Laos, North Korea, Vietnam, and the rapid economic developments in Japan, South Korea, Republic of China on Taiwan, Chinese People’s Republic, India, Malaysia, Singapore, just to name the most salient. Weber, whose one focus was economy, might have seen himself in need of re-examining the older theories. These occurrences make it difficult to formulate general statements. The old questions of common characteristics and points of cultural comparison today are amended by at least one more: Do economic developments influence the mental structure of people?

Is economic activity or incipient prosperity being reflected – in Needham’s opinion – in greater stability, or – in Max Weber’s coordinates – in worldly ascetism, or – my own derivation – in lesser detachment resp. increasing attachment to this world? Karl Marx would say: Of course, the economy shapes the mind of people. Charles de Gaulle would disagree and repeat his post-World-War-II statement (with a look at post-war occupied Germany) that the characters and mind-sets of a people never alter, in spite of all historical, economical, political, or military changes. In my earlier book (1995/2004), I defended the position that the modes of thought which are behind the cultures and shape them, are rather fixed mental constructs, but that modes of thought can change and thus cultures, too. For example, the axial age was defined as a period in the mental development of mankind that brought about many changes. Therefore, it was then held probable that philosophical theories and lofty moralities, such as that of the Bhagavat-Gita, or a feeling of attachment to or detachment from this world shape the consciousness of whole populations (loc. cit at 325).

³¹² In the Modes of Thought (1995/2004), this is a point where the description of the post-axial-age *modes of thought* begins (295 et seq.). In the present book, the expressions of the modes of thought, cultures, are being focussed. Again, the characterizations will be brief. Many traits can simply be seen by analogy.

³¹³ A survey on both kinds of literature in W. Fikentscher (1995/2004), 299 et seq.

³¹⁴ See the discussions of both opinions loc. cit. 313 et seq.

This was stated despite Pospíšil's warnings (1971: 19): "Preoccupied with the notion that actual behaviour of people is controlled and guided by the various leading philosophies of the nations, Northrop implicitly equated Ehrlich's living law with these philosophies."³¹⁵ He concluded that to understand, for example, the Chinese living law, one would have to study Confucian philosophy, while to understand modern Russian living law one must turn to Marx-Leninism ... Besides the fact that an overwhelming majority of the Chinese were ... ignorant of the official Confucian philosophy, nothing can be farther from Ehrlich's living law than principles of well-formulated scholarly philosophies which usually are the property of very few in a given society; "living law" derives from the actual behavior of people, not from officially recognized theories posited in scholarly treatises."

Against Pospíšil one can argue that it may not be learned books and "official philosophies" which shape the mind-set of a culture. Of course, it would be ridiculous to contend that *every* Hindu, Buddhist, Taoist and Confucianist thinks in terms of detachment from this world and of self-centeredness according to the Bhagavat-Gita morality. But there may be a general trend within a specific culture, an underlying generally accepted attitude towards the approach to ontological and epistemological data, an opinion that finds my support because the power and persistence of philosophically founded cultural attitudes are observable, if covert, data. Thus, economic change and beginning prosperity are – as such – no reasons to assume a culture change or change of a culture-shaping mode of thought. This is generally true, and it is true for East and South Asia. Thus, detachment must be searched in older and more modern developments there, and the question is whether the recent developments were strong enough to cause culture change. But both Hinduism and even more Buddhism view world and life in it with a critical, resigned attitude, still today. *Samsara* and the Eightfold Path to possibly and slowly escape it are not joyous, this-worldly, and not even combative approaches to the meaning of human life. A hidden causality and a hard-to-obtain wordly-ascetic betterment are the strands of fate. Modernity is accepted, to be sure, and energetic activities unfold along with modernity. Still, the Bhagavad-Gita remains the ultimate ethical point of orientation, and it places care for one's own personal and the world's betterment in general terms over serving thy neighbor here and now and getting organized for that, even if this conduct is lethal for one's own family members (see, to the same effect, the Koranic verses 4.80 (2), 4.81 (3), 6.164 (Bobzin); 9.113; 35.18 (Henning); 53.18 (Bobzin); 60.4 (Bobzin); 480 (2), 481 (3) and 9.113, all taken from www.intratext.com/ixt/deu0081, last visited Jan. 5, 2015).

Is it therefore legitimate, in view of the general attitude of *detachment* which can be discerned in East and South Asian cultures, to speak of just one East and South Asian mode of thought? Just because there are a great number of cultures in this geographic area there must not be equally as many cultural modes of thought. It cannot be denied that all these cultures – with the partial exception of Confucianism – share the themes of detachment from the world and self-centeredness, both in a non-individualistic sense. According to the theory of cultural plurality, the possibility of *one* mode of thought common to these disparate cultures may be tenable.

But – to use two extremes – modern Japanese Zen-Buddhism is far less "awe-inspired" (and "-inspiring") than for example the elaborate services and modes of worship of Taoism, Tantrism and Vajrayana (the "diamond-vehicle"), so that the

³¹⁵ Pospíšil alludes to Northrop 1946 and 1949; see also the similar statement about the necessary distinction between culture on the one hand and the "nationalist world" on the other by Christopher M. Hann, *Creeds, Cultures and the 'Witchery of Music'*, 9/2 J. of the Royal Anthropological Institute 223–239 (2003) at 234 et seq.

existence of cultural plurality per se ought to be accepted as decisive. Therefore, several East and South Asian modes of thought and a substantial number of cultures sustained by these modes of thought may be combined to form the geographic cultural “province” (Adolf Bastian) of East and South Asia. At the same time, the empirical observation is still valid that they are all alike in one point of central impact: a detached view on world and life.

While in Hinduism an escape from eternal reiteration seems almost impossible, Buddhism teaches such escape under the conditions of the Eightfold Path. In this respect, the two branches of Buddhism are of importance. Hinayana Buddhism (the smaller vehicle, practiced in Thailand, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and parts of Laos, Vietnam, and Korea) maintains the purer and stricter dogma, Mahayana Buddhism (the larger vehicle, practiced in the other Buddhist regions, including Japan, China, and Indonesia) is the more lenient version, including the belief in spirits and in Bodisattvas, persons who completed the Eightfold Path to the point of near-fulfilment, and then decided to help others to move ahead on the Path to reach the *Nirvana* together with them as well. Especially by the introduction of the Bodisattvas, an element of mercy, caring, and compassion – and thus elements of attachment – enters Buddhist conviction.³¹⁶

With Confucianism, traits may be different, at least at first sight. Confucianism’s attachment to the aim of making this world a decent and liveable place (see 2. above) should be taken into serious consideration, and separate answers should be given when thought-modal consequences are discussed. However, the gnostic approach to self-cultivation which is also inherent in Confucianism will lead to results similar to other East and South Asian modes of thought. Confucius’ ethics teach an attachment to this world up to a certain, albeit distanced and practice-oriented, degree. There are five inter-human relations whom have to be guarded: the relationships between father and son, husband and wife, emperor and subject, older brother and younger brother, (older) friend and (younger) friend. These are five basic vertical ties. However, this attachment does not lead far into this world because it is mainly – if not altogether – meant for the good days. Confucian rules teach how to make good days a reality. However, if events go wrong, the teachings of Confucius offer no dogmatic or ethical parachute. In comparison, even Protestant work ethics offer redemption. Thus, In Confucianism, attachment is partly withheld. It may be called a semi-attachment, or a semi-detachment.

The five Confucian virtues are:

Zhi () = wisdom, knowledge

Xin () = trustworthiness

Li () = propriety, rites (there are 300 rules of rites, and 3000 of dignified manner)

Yi () = righteousness, and

Ren () = humanity, benevolence (including cultivating personality and observing good practice).³¹⁷

For the bad days, Confucianism gives no instructions to its followers. A Chinese adage is “A person with a determined heart frightens problems away”, so that a strong

³¹⁶ In Japanese, Bodisattvas are called Bosatsu (a combination of botei satsutaba). The term busutsu appears to have been fallen in disuse; cf. W. Fikentscher (1995/2005), 305, communication Eike Mai Rapsch. On other differences between Hinayanism and Mahayanism, see W. Fikentscher, loc. cit. 303 et seq., idem, (1975 a), 303 et seq.; H.-J. Klimkeit, *Visible Religion* (journal E.J. Brill, Leiden), 7/1990, 355 et seq. (lotus flower).

³¹⁷ Copied from five stones placed in front of the new Asia Building of the University of British Columbia, 2000 West Mall, Vancouver, Canada.